LEGITIMISING THE ILLEGITIMATE : EXTENDING INTERPRETATION BEYOND REALITY. THE SHRIMP FAIRYTALE AND ITS IMPLICATIONS by Martin, Mervyn
221
Jurnal Hukum Internasional
Volume 13 Number 2 January 2016
LEGITIMISING THE ILLEGITIMATE : EXTENDING 
INTERPRETATION BEYOND REALITY. THE 
SHRIMP FAIRYTALE AND ITS IMPLICATIONS
Mervyn Martin *
Abstract
The challenges of liberalization of international trade; Firstly was the realization that in the past 
there was a tendency to be satisfied with sweeping, unspecific statements on best principles, which 
always led to often a meaningless outcome without hard and fast commitments. The second was their 
episodic character. The notion of dispute settlement involves conflicting assertions as to the rights and 
obligations of the parties involved. Disputes arise from freely entered relationships between parties 
that create expectations as to their future conduct. there existed a three-pronged objective of the 
negotiating plan indicated from the Negotiating Group on Dispute Settlement for the UR negotiating 
process. The use of interpretory aids may become necessary when there is ambiguity in the text of 
the agreement. The observations indicate that that the Trade Stakeholder model is flawed in some 
agreement and the increasing influence of this model can be seen from an observation of similar-type 
cases over the years. Consistency on attempts to manipulate negotiated rights and obligation through 
“extended” approach became clear in Shrimp. Current slant of DSC decisions should continue to be 
applied. 
Keywords: agreement, interpretation, dispute settlement, solution.
I.  INTRODUCTION
We live in an ever globalizing world. With greater integration as a 
result of globalization it is vital that the international trading system 
provides a platform that sufficiently supports the ability of all players to 
benefit from globalization.1 This platform is referred to as the multilat-
eral trading system which, through the World Trade organization pro-
vides a series of agreements that seek to regulate international trading 
activity. The current agreements were negotiated over a period span-
ning more than a decade, and therefore has to be appreciated within the 
context of which compromise and agreement were arrived upon. This 
is especially true as the previous platform, the GATT 1947 is said to 
* Author is a Lecturer of International Law at Universitas Brawijaya. He obtained his 
Bachelor of Law and Master of Law from Universitas Brawijaya. He can be reached 
at setiawanwicaksono@ub.ac.id.
1  M.Martin, “WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding and Development”, Nijhoff 
International Trade Law Series, 2013
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have become obsolete as it failed to accommodate developments within 
the international trading system. Therefore, there are a number of mat-
ters that must be weighed when seeking to appreciate the context upon 
which the foundations that this regulatory system was built upon.
The notion of international trade integration is often referred to as 
free trade.2 Although not a hundred percent linguistically accurate as 
even free trade as a policy concept contains some restriction,3 free trade 
basically means the elimination of all artificial/protective trade barriers 
to the exchange of products across national markets. The idea is that 
prices faced by producers and consumers will be determined by the 
world market, reflected by the availability of such goods.4 Indeed, some 
early free trade writers viewed the world market as one unit, and the 
quest for benefit and advantage was seen as a mutual endeavor through-
out the world.5 Much of the underlying considerations and objectives of 
the free trade approach relate to concepts of efficiency in production, a 
large market base and that market barriers lead to inefficiencies.6 
 According to trade theorists,7 the basic/pure theory of trade is con-
cerned with answering two sets of questions. First, why and how countries 
gain from trade. Second, is to explain the pattern of that trade, basically 
meaning why certain countries export some goods, and import others.8 
The first set is called welfare economics, while the second set is called 
positive economics. Welfare economics is primarily concerned with the 
effects of trade on real income, total satisfaction, welfare and develop-
2  Ibid.
3  Examples include national security, protection of public morals, food safety and the 
contentious development policy vehicles such as infant industry protection and local 
content requirement
4  D. Irwin, Against the Tide : an intellectual history of free trade, Princeton University 
Press, 1996. P. 5
5  D. Irwin, ibid, at p. 60, referencing the work of Jacob Vanderlint, 1734.
6  Irwin, ibid, p. 87. The consolidation of the case for free trade through the theory of 
comparative advantage was developed by the classical economists in the 19th Century 
following through from Adam Smith’s ideas. 
7  A. Smith, The Wealth of Nations, New York: Modern Library, 1994 [1776] and D. 
Ricardo, On the Principles of Political Economy, and Taxation, Harmondsworth: Pen-
guin, 1971 (Originally published 1817)
8  N. Grimwade, International Trade; New Patterns of Trade, Production and Invest-
ment, 2nd Edition, Routledge, 2000, p. 29-30 
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ment. Positive economics involves considerations that are non-monetary, 
and focuses on the structure, volume and direction of trade: focusing on 
the efficiency in production and between factors of production. 
According to a prominent Classical trade theorist, Adam Smith, 
trade is a basic manifestation of human nature through the propensity to 
trade, barter and exchange one thing for another.9 To substantiate such 
an assertion, Smith submitted that instead of attempting to produce all 
products that they were able to, a country should focus on producing 
products where they enjoyed a cost advantage over other countries. By 
doing so, their resources would be concentrated on specialization in 
producing such goods leading to greater efficiency and higher output. 
Smith also advocated for a large market base, stating that this would 
lead to wealth creation. To achieve this trade should be impediment 
free. Hence countries could then trade their surplus resulting in higher 
output from greater efficiency, at lower prices, based on the requisite 
terms of trade. The bigger the market base for trade the greater the 
wealth creation and satisfaction leading to welfare and development 
enhancement resulting from specialized production and trade. Smith’s 
theory has been criticized for placing too much emphasis on absolute 
costs differences. However a number of subsequent theorists support 
the basic idea of specialization and large, impediment free market.10 
Although mankind have been actively involved in cross border ex-
change of goods from the beginning of recorded history,11 the full im-
pact of trade theory in practice can be appreciated from attitudes taken 
by major economies through their international trade policy practic-
es in the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.12 As a result of this 
9  A. Smith, supra note 7, p. 14
10  See J. S Mill, Principles of Political Economy [1884]. Ed. W.J Ashley  London, 
1909. See M. Trebilcock and R. Howse, The Regulation of International Trade,  3rd 
edition, Routledge, 2005, p. 5, for example David Ricardo,  the Heckcher-Ohlin Theo-
rem through the Factor Proportions Hypothesis  and Raymond Vernon of the Harvard 
Business School through his Product Cycle Theory..
11  S. Kemp, “Psychology and Opposition to Free Trade”, World Trade Review, Vol-
ume 6:1, 2007, 25-44, p. 27
See also R. Horan, E. Bulte, and J. Shogren, “How Trade Saved Humanity from Bio-
logical Extinction : An Economic Theory of Neanderthal Extinction” Journal of Eco-
nomic behavior and Organization, 58 (1) 1-29
12   M. Trebilcock and R. Howse, supra note 10, p. 21
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long relationship between man and the need to trade, it is expected that 
through such activity, customary practices developed including the no-
tion of fair exchange and fair distribution arising from such activity.13 
The influence of free trade precepts are connected to the quest for larger 
market bases, which led to greater unification of markets. As a result, 
barriers within domestic markets fell. This inevitably led to the practice 
of free trade being taken into a wider context as countries practiced 
such principles when trading across national borders. The repealing of 
the Corn Laws in 1846 which has been attributed in part to the influence 
of Smith and Ricardo, was followed by unilateral liberalization in Brit-
ain. Many other major European economies like France and Germany 
followed suit and as a result, these major economies negotiated trade 
liberalizing treaties between them. Contained within these treaties was 
the most favored nation (MFN) principle which in essence meant that 
they would extend to each other any more favorable concessions that 
each might subsequently negotiate with third countries,14 or in other 
words automatic reciprocity. This reinforced the environment for free 
trade and reciprocity and the importance of creating and maintaining a 
greater market base to this end. This move significantly contributed to 
multilateralism with the spread of standard provisions and treatment. 
These treaties also had a knock-on effect which led to the adoption 
of conventions to support the objectives of trade liberalising treaties 
especially in relation to transport and communication which further fa-
cilitated trade expansion.15 Hence, the regulation of international trade 
requires a system that ensures automatic reciprocity as well as one that 
is rule based rather than power based, supported by a fair and effective 
dispute settlement mechanism.
Between the two world wars, conferences/discussions were un-
dertaken on the challenges of liberalization of international trade.16. It 
13  R. Trivers, The Evolution of Reciprocal Altruism” Quarterly Review of Biology, 
Vol 46 (1) 35-57, March 1971, p. 37 available at JOSTOR http://jstor.org, accessed on 
26/5/07 at 3.30 pm 
14   See discussion by R. Spaulding Jr, “German Trade Policy in Eastern Europe, 
1890-1990: preconditions for Applying International Trade Leverage” International 
Organization, Vol 45, N0. 3 (summer 1991)pp. 343-368, p. 349 and also M. Trebilcock 
and R. Howse, supra note 10, p. 21
15   M. Trebilcock and R. Howse, supra note 10, p. 21
16  Robert E Hudec, The GATT Legal System and World Trade Diplomacy, Butterworth 
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is claimed that two aspects of the interwar conferences were of great 
value to international economic law. Firstly was the realization that in 
the past there was a tendency to be satisfied with sweeping, unspecific 
statements on best principles, which always led to often a meaningless 
outcome without hard and fast commitments. The second was their epi-
sodic character.17 These can be grouped as gaining an insight from past 
mistakes where agreements of a vague nature did not serve to attain the 
requirements of the trading environment of the day. What was required 
was a rule-based system with clear certain rules supported by an effec-
tive dispute settlement mechanism.18 Further, without any long term 
framework, it was easy for trading partners to slip back to mercantilist 
based policies.19
Subsequent international conferences provided trade officials from 
major trading nations the opportunity to do exactly this, which eventu-
ally resulted in the commissioning of draft texts dealing with the main 
trade restrictive issues of the time. The drafting exercises allowed of-
ficials the opportunity to re-examine problematic issues previously cir-
cumvented by the unspecific wordings in earlier initiatives, and more 
importantly, to clarify what indeed such ambiguity meant. 20 This moti-
vation led to the crafting of the International Trade organization (ITO), 
which was an ambitious initiative said to have been capable of produc-
ing the platform that would have addressed all these concerns. How-
ever, the resulting reluctance by the major players of the time to commit 
to such far reaching reforms in the international system led to the ITO’s 
failure. Instead the GATT 1047 which was meant to be only one com-
ponent of the ITO survived as the multilateral trading system regulatory 
platform for the following five decades, before it was replaced. Over 
the course of fifty or so years, underlying philosophies of regulation 
changed. The GATT 1947 focused on negative harmonization which is 
eliminating discrimination. During the run up to the conclusion of the 
Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations, focus moved to a 
Legal Publishers, Second Edition, 1990, p. 5.
17  Robert E Hudec, ibid, p. 7
18  M.Martin, supra note 1
19  J. Ruggie, “International Regimes, Transactions and Change: Embedded Liber-
alism in the Postwar Economic Order”, International Organization,  Vol 36, No. 2 
International regimes, (Spring 1982), pp 379-415, p. 384
20  Robert E Hudec, supra note 16, p. 8
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new philosophy for the regulation of international trade, namely posi-
tive harmonization, towards harmonization of national policies.21 Some 
authors indicate that such harmonization involves the trading of trade 
policies.22 What is evident in relation to harmonization however is that 
the degree of harmonization needed to be stepped up. In fact towards 
the end of the GATT’s life, the Tokyo Round of negotiations actually 
split the diverse membership of the GATT, indicating that the GATT as 
a regulatory platform could no longer sustain the multilateral trading 
system. Times had changed. There were new players in the internation-
al trading system, and the international trading environment provided 
for new opportunities, which really required the inclusion of these new 
players who mostly were developing countries. The result was the es-
tablishment of the World Trade organization (WTO) in 1995.
Much of the discontentment with the regulatory base under the 
GATT 1947 was expected to be abated with the conclusion of the UR 
which brought some important developments. Firstly was the single un-
dertaking commitment which unified the coverage of the agreements. 
This rectified the splitting and segregation of members.23 The WTO also 
created a framework for liberalization of trade in services, protection 
of intellectual property rights and very importantly, formalized and im-
proved dispute settlement. 
The notion of dispute settlement involves conflicting assertions as 
to the rights and obligations of the parties involved.24 A legal dispute 
refers to conflicts of rights between parties within the jurisdiction of a 
dispute settlement mechanism (DSM) but does not involve conflicts of 
interests of the parties.25 Therefore one may conclude that it is the rights 
21   V. Heiskanen, “The Regulatory Philosophy of International Trade Law”, Journal 
of World Trade, 38 (1), 1-36, 2004, p. 29
22  B. Hoekman and M. Kostecki, The Political Economy of the World Trading System, 
The WTO and Beyond, 2nd Edition, Oxford University Press, 2001, p. 27 
23  Hans van Houtte, The Law of International Trade, 2nd edition, London Sweet and 
Maxwell, 2002, 
p. 77
24  P. Behrens, “Adjudicative Methods of Dispute Settlement in International Eco-
nomic Relations”, in E. Petersmann and G. Jaenicke, Adjudication of International 
Trade Disputes in International and National Economic Law, PUPIL volume 7, D. 
Dickie (ed), University Press, Fribourg Switzerland, 1992, p. 5
25  Article 25 of the ICSID Convention on Settlement of Investment Disputes Between 
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and obligations that are covered in the agreements through which the 
dispute is raised is of prime importance in a dispute settlement proceed-
ing. Disputes arise from freely entered relationships between parties 
that create expectations as to their future conduct. Such expectations 
are upon what parties plan their future conduct. Such a conclusion in 
turn gives rise to two situations. Firstly, conflict of interests should have 
been resolved before binding obligations were entered into, as, to al-
low conflicting interests subsequent to reaching a negotiated compro-
mise would make the DSM redundant, and secondly, rights and obliga-
tions of parties’ under the DSM cannot be extended without the parties’ 
agreement. It is submitted that in the context of a multilateral agreement 
the magnitude of the WTO, such extension would entail proper nego-
tiations where the benefits of the proposed wider coverage would be 
weighed against national policies/interests before further binding obli-
gations are entered into. 
When parties negotiated the Uruguay Round Agreements, includ-
ing the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU), they intended 
a rule-oriented system. The pre-UR power-oriented system, premised 
on the use of ones party’s dominance/power to influence the conduct of 
the other party, has been criticised as having the aim of redistributing 
income to the benefit of the powerful26 and not satisfying the balanced 
development requirements resulting from the evolution of the interna-
tional system in general. The rule-oriented approach is instead based on 
free negotiation.27 This notion of free negotiation was necessary as the 
multilateral trading system grew in scope and character, creating new 
problems in international economic relations resulting from a congru-
ence of circumstances.28 To meet the measure of discipline that was re-
States and Nationals of Other States, 1965. ICSID Doc. R 65-6, para.25 (8 January 
1965) available at http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/basicdoc-archive/17.htm, at 5.10 
pm on 20 July 2004.
26  See E. Petersmann, “The GATT Dispute Settlement and the Uruguay Negotiations 
on its Reform”, in P. Sarcevic and H. van Houtte (eds), Legal Issues in International 
Trade, Graham & Trotman/Martinus Nijhoff, 1990, pp. 55-57 for discussion.
27  Ibid, p. 56. 
28  J. Jackson, The World Trade Organization, Constitution and Jurisprudence, The 
Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1998, p. 13. See also D. Mc. Rea”What is the 
Future of WTO Dispute Settlement” Journal of International Economic Law 7(1) 
3-21, Oxford University Press 2004, p. 3. Examples of such congruence were dis-
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quired for national governments to take initiatives to attain the desired 
integration, a check on the ability of national governments to backslide 
on their commitments was necessary. 29 Some authors have recognised 
that the nature of binding decisions of the rule-oriented approach is a 
basis for long-term obligations based on mutual agreement, and that 
this approach would avoid the risks of over dependence on diplomatic 
solutions that would inevitably reflect the relative power of the parties,30 
especially in a forum with such a diverse membership as the WTO. The 
function of multilateral trade rules as described by some authors is to 
maximise welfare and this is achieved through a rule-oriented settle-
ment of such disputes.31 Hence, the final outcome of dispute settlement 
negotiations in the UR was a rule-oriented approach evidenced by the 
adjudicative features of the system,32 as an attractive and transparent 
alternative to unilateral measures and a system that could protect the 
contractual rights of all members including developing nations.33
A degree of consultations was included into the dispute settlement 
process, as some authors state34 providing for both diplomatic and le-
gal means of addressing the issue at hand, therefore maximizing the 
chances of settlement by successive or alternative use of different meth-
ods. This view on the surface would seem to describe the WTO DSU. 
However, in viewing the decision to negotiate for improving the dispute 
settlement at the UR, and in appreciation of the prevailing situation of 
dispute settlement at that time and the deficiencies that a new DSU was 
meant to rectify, together with the clear subdivision between the con-
ciliatory/consultative and actual panel/adjudicatory process, the view 
of there being alternative processes is criticized as inaccurate. Consul-
tations required by Article 4 of the DSU are undertaken as part of the 
entire dispute settlement process. It should be viewed as being sequen-
tial in nature. Engaging in consultation is without prejudice to the right 
cussed in chapter 1 of this paper.
29  J. Jackson, ibid, p. 24
30  E. Petersmann, supra note 26, p. 59
31 J. Jackson, supra note 28 p. 57
32  This includes the panel process, independence, written exchange between parties 
and the time limits. See discussion at E. Petersmann, supra note 26, p. 64
33  J. Brewer and S. Young, “WTO Disputes and Developing Countries”, Journal of 
World Trade 33 (5) 169-182, 1999, p. 172. 
34 E. Petersmann, supra note 26, p. 57
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of any party to proceed with requesting the establishment of a panel 
should an amicable solution not be reached. 
A reading of the dispute settlement-negotiating plan of the Nego-
tiating Group on Dispute Settlement for the UR negotiating process,35 
indicates that there existed a three-pronged objective of the negotiat-
ing plan. These were, firstly that there was acceptance that greater ef-
fectiveness and enforceability of rights and obligations under GATT 
rules was beneficial to all members, and therefore desired. Secondly, 
to achieve this, the rules and procedures relating to dispute settlement 
needed to be strengthened with the ultimate view of, the third objective, 
the attainment of an effective and efficient method of resolving disputes 
arising from the covered agreements. The resulting large number of 
proposals submitted for this exercise36 indicated that there was a high 
degree of interest across the board to achieve the goals identified in the 
agreed negotiating plan. 
However, developing countries have expressed concern over the in-
terpretation and application of the WTO Agreements.37 The accumulat-
ed jurisprudence of the WTO dispute settlement system thus far reveals 
that the interest and perceptions of developing countries have not been 
adequately taken into account. The Panels and Appellate Bodies have 
displayed an excessive concern for legalism.38 
Some authors are of the opinion that the Appellate Body prefers 
the literal approach to interpretation.39 This form of interpretation is 
criticized in that it stops any examination of the intention of the parties 
35  This Negotiating Group being part of the Uruguay Round negotiating process 
which consisted of 14 such individual groups reporting to the central Trade Negotia-
tions Committee.
36  E. Petersmann, “Settlement of International and National Trade Disputes Through 
the GATT:The Case of Antidumping Law”, in E. Petersmann and G. Jaenicke, Adju-
dication of International Trade Disputes in International and National Economic Law, 
PUPIL volume 7, D. Dickie (ed), University Press, Fribourg Switzerland, 1992, p. 55
37  A. Qureshi, “Interpreting World Trade Organisation Agreements for the Develop-
ment Objective” Journal of World Trade 37 (5) 847-882, 2003,  p. 848 
38  Zambia on behalf of the LDC Group, (TN/DS/W/17) 9 October 2002
39  C. Ehlermann, ““Six Years on the Bench of the World Trade Court”. Some Personal 
Experiences as a Member of the Appellate Body of the World Trade Organisation”, 
Journal of World Trade , 36 (4) 2002, 605-639, p
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or objects and purpose of the agreement.40 Therefore, there cannot be 
security and predictability where the intention of parties expressed in 
the objectives and purpose of the agreement are being diluted. Other 
authors find that interpretation of WTO Agreements should be based 
on the fact that there is an overall balance of concessions in the WTO.41 
The issue with interpretation of the DSU itself as well as the cov-
ered agreements by Panels and the Appellate Body can best be appreci-
ated through what this paper seeks to introduce as the “extended” ap-
proach.42 When Members decided to replace the power-based approach 
of relationships between themselves to a more rule-based approach, the 
value of negotiations and discussion between Members were not un-
der-preserved. The nature of international/multilateral trade requires an 
avenue to propose, discuss and exchange technical know-how of new 
issues before binding obligations are undertaken. However, the diver-
sity of interests between Members and caution especially amongst de-
veloping countries has meant that the work progress for the acceptance 
of expansion of regulatory coverage by developing countries has been 
slow. This has caused a degree of frustration amongst some developed 
countries causing them to increasingly require the covered agreements 
to be interpreted to extract the intentions of the parties of the agree-
ments during dispute settlement as a means of “smuggling in” new, 
especially non-trade issues into the DSU,43 thereby adjusting the pa-
rameters or extent of consent to be bound, and displacing the intended 
40  A. Qureshi,supra note 37,  p 866. See also A. Chua, “Reasonable Expectations and 
non-Violation Complaints in GATT/WTO Jurisprudence”, Journal of World Trade 32 
(2) 27-50, 1998, for a discussion on the principle of reasonable expectations and sub-
sequent assumptions as a result. 
41  G. Marceau, “WTO Dispute Settlement and Human Rights” 13 E.J.I.L 4 (2002) 
753-841
42  As opposed to the rule-based and power-based approaches discussed above. See 
discussion in D. Shanker “The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties , the Dispute 
Settlement System of the WTO and the Doha declaration on the TRIPS Agreement” 
Journal of World Trade 36 (4) 721-772, 2002 on how the over use of interpretation 
under the Vienna convention can undermine the WTO DSU.
43  According to D. Mc. Rea supra note 28, , p. 3, there is practice of Members to use 
dispute settlement to gain further clarification of provisions in order to expand the 
scope of existing obligations to encompass matters which no negotiating progress has 
been made.
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rule-based system.44 The dangers of such an approach have been recog-
nized earlier by some authors,45 although others have been inclined to 
assert that such an approach is judicial activism by the appellate body.46 
This is criticized as such interpretation is as a result of certain Members 
persistently requiring interpretation of the covered agreements that has 
brought about this phenomenon. Some authors observe that these are 
attempts to use the dispute settlement process to pursue matters that 
they are unable to win in negotiations despite Article 3 (2) DSU that the 
DSB cannot add or diminish rights and obligations provided under the 
covered agreements.47 
Connected to the “extended” approach is the Trade Stakeholder 
model.48 This model is premised on the pursuance of interests of certain 
segments of stakeholders or pressure groups in a Member’s economy.49 
44  Accordingly, .J. Weiler in “The Rule of Lawyers and the Ethos of Diplomats”, 
Journal of World Trade 35 (2) 191-207, 2001, p. 194 asks the question if the shift in 
paradigm in relation to the WTO DSU has been a victory for the rule of law or a vic-
tory for the rule of lawyers, asserting that such developments have not benefited the 
deeper objectives of the WTO. M. Dunne, “Redefining Power Orientation : A Reas-
sessment of Jackson’s paradigm in Light of Asymmetries of Power, Negotiation and 
Compliance in the GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement System”, 34 Law and Policy in 
International Business 277, Fall 2002, p. 280 suggests the need to reconsider the tra-
ditional understanding of the realist perspective of “power-based” to a new contextual 
understanding that is not static in its approach to the meaning of “power-based”. D. 
Shanker supra note 42, discusses how the interpretative approach is now influencing 
the WTO negotiating agenda. 
45  C. Ehlermann, “Six Years on the Bench of the World Trade Court”. Some Personal 
Experiences as a Member of the Appellate Body of the World Trade Organisation”, 
Journal of World Trade , 36 (4) 2002, 605-639, at p. 605 
46  R. Steinburg, “Judicial Law making at the WTO : Discursive, Constitutional and 
Political Constraints”, 98 American Journal International Law 247, April 2004. See 
also E. Vermulst, P. Mavroidis and P. Waer, “The Functioning of the Appellate Body 
After Four Years : Towards Rule Integrity”, Journal of World Trade, 33 (2), 1-50, 
1999, p. 23
47  T. Stewart, P. McDonough and M. Prado, “Opportunities for Increased Liberalisa-
tion of Goods “ Making Sure Rules Work for All and That Special Needs Are Ad-
dressed”, 24 Fordham International Law Journal 652, Nov/Dec 2000, p. 672 
48  M. Trebilcock and R. Howse, The Regulation of International Trade, 2nd Edition 
Routledge, 1999  p. 55 are very much in favour of this model
49  J. Schultz, “The Demise of “Green” Protectionism : the WTO Decision on US Gas-
oline Rule” 25 Denver Journal of International Law and Policy 1, Fall 1996, provides 
a discussion and illustration of such a model is used by pressure groups to overcome 
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The naive rational of this model50 does not consider that to permit the 
infiltration of such a model into the WTO DSU would be legitimizing 
public choice policies.51 Within an administration, a government has 
to weigh the interests of all its stakeholders. It is very often that the 
many stakeholders in one country would have conflicting interests. If 
the interest of one segment of stakeholders is pursued to the detriment 
of another, the rational given by such authors for the importance of this 
model holds very little water. In pursuing an international agreement, 
such interests should have been weighed domestically and exercised 
through a member’s foreign policy. The use of interpretative strategies 
to mound or manipulate the outcome of a prior agreement cannot logi-
cally be calibrated with the intentions of parties at the time of negotia-
tions.52 The use of the extended approach to satisfy the trade stakeholder 
model goes against the grain of dispute settlement in general which is to 
provide security and predictability to the covered agreements.
The use of interpretory aids may become necessary when there is 
ambiguity in the text of the agreement.53 Accordingly, there must be 
good reason to doubt the natural sense of the words used in the trea-
ty.54 It is submitted that the opinion of a segment of the population of 
a Member will not satisfy this test. As a government is charged to bal-
ance the interests of all its stakeholders before undertaking binding 
commitments internationally, a dissatisfied group, notwithstanding an 
appreciation of the degree of influence such a group may have on the 
the competitive edge of foreign exporters and operates as a non-tariff barrier.
50  Especially explained and applied by M. Trebilcock and R. Howse, supra note 48, 
in Chapter 3
51  E. Icobucci, “The Interdependence of Trade and Competition Policies”, 21 (2) 
World Competition 1997, p. 12 for a discussion on the ill effects of public choice poli-
cies which according to him will negatively impact on global welfare.
52  According to L. Bartels in “Article XX of GATT and the Problem of Extraterrito-
rial Jurisdiction : The Case of Trade measures for the Protection of Human Rights”, 
Journal of World Trade 36 (2), 2002,the use of the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties to justify extraterritorial application of human rights and environmental poli-
cies cannot be said to form intention of Members notwithstanding Article 3 (2) DSU 
as this would be adding to rights and obligations of members.  
53  See M. Fitzmaurice, “The Practical Workings of the Law of Treaties”, in M. Evans 
(ed), International Law, Oxford University Press, 2003, pp. 185-187
54  Interpretation of the Convention of 1919 Concerning Employment of Women Dur-
ing the Night, Advisory Opinion, 1932, PCIJ, Ser A/B, No. 50, p. 365
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survival of the government of the day in that country should not negate 
the principle of pacta sunt servanda.55
Observations by other authors56 indicate that the Trade Stakehold-
er model is flawed in that Article XVI of the Marrakesh Agreement,57 
paragraph 4 requires each member to ensure that their domestic laws 
are in conformity with their obligations under the covered agreements. 
Further it has been pointed out that the purpose of providing the security 
and predictability under Article 3 (2) DSU was for all such stakehold-
ers to regulate their affairs in accordance with the covered agreements. 
The increasing influence of this model can be seen from an obser-
vation of similar-type cases over the years. In Tuna/Dolphin 1,58 the 
United States (US) were not allowed to ban imports of Mexican tuna 
based on the process used to catch the tuna as it did not affect the tuna 
as a product. 59 The US claimed that Mexican fishermen failed to sat-
isfy US authorities that the methods they used did not cause damage 
to dolphins. In criticizing this ruling, supporters of the Trade Stake-
holder model state that such import restrictions are not for protection 
of domestic industry but for the protection of global common environ-
ment. If it were a global issue, then unilaterally imposing obligations on 
Mexican fishermen would not seem to be a coherent method of solving 
a global problem. Indeed, a global matter would require a global solu-
tion.60 Apart from the WTO, there are a number of specialized environ-
55  Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1969.
56  J. Jackson, “International Law Status of WTO Dispute Settlement Reports:Obligation 
to Comply or Option to “Buy Out”?, Americal Journal International Law, 98 (109), 
January 2004, p. 116
57  Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organisation 1994
58 United States-Restriction on Import of Tuna (action brought by Mexico) report cir-
culated but not adopted 1991, available at www.wto.org/tratop_e/envir_e/edis04_e.
htm as at 8.20 pm 16 August 2004
59  Article III (1), The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994
60 M. Martin, “Child Labour in Developing Countries:- reasons and solutions”,A pre-
sentation at the SLSA Annual Conference, University of Striling, 2006. See also M. 
Martin, “Child Labour: A Global Problem Requiring a Global solution”, a 4 part series 
in the Sunday Citizen, Dar Es Salaam, Tanzania, ISSN 0856-9754, 20 Jan 2008-10 
Feb 2008, M. Martin “Child Labour, Parameters, Development Implications, Causes 
and Consequences” Contemporary Social Science: Journal of the Academy of Social 
Sciences Special Issue: Young People, Social Science Research and the Law Volume 
8, Issue 2, 2013
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mental fora that provide a platform for discussion and agreement. This 
of course would entail negotiating a global standard, not necessarily 
an American one, but one that would entail negotiation and bargain-
ing. Dismissing the US attempts to make its actions compatible with 
its obligations under the WTO through Article XX (b), the panel stated 
that in order for the exception to be operative, the test of necessity is to 
show that all other less trade restrictive means of solving the problem 
were exhausted. This included international cooperation. Interestingly, 
no mention was made on the importance of the higher objective of the 
WTO, namely the need to maintain a liberal trading regime.
In Tuna/Dolphin II61 the panel maintained the need to restrict the 
unilateral imposition of US laws extraterritorially for inducing policy 
changes in other countries, although changing the view of the use of 
GATT 1994 Article XX (b) and (g) exceptions, stating that these could 
be used for the protection of environment beyond domestic borders, 
provided other less trade restrictive means were exhausted. 
Promulgators of the Trade Stakeholder model are further confused 
over the decision of Taxes on Automobiles.62 Although supporting the 
approach of such cases on a case-by-case basis,63 the very fundamental 
differences between the two Tuna cases and this one is missed. The 
consideration in Taxes on Automobiles was that the “wasteful” act of 
consuming higher fuel was occurring in the US. However, in Tunas I & 
II, the “wasteful” act occurred outside the US. Therefore, the unilateral 
extraterritorial application of US laws, in the case of Taxes on Automo-
biles did not occur. The decision would have been different if import 
restrictions were placed by the US on, say, vegetables that were trans-
ported on a high fuel consuming trucks in another country. 
The decision of Taxes on Automobiles must be distinguished from 
that of Reformulated Gasoline.64 The US restricted the importation of 
61  United States-Restriction on Import of Tuna (action brought by EC) report cir-
culated but not adopted 16 July 1994, available at www.wto.org/tratop_e/envir_e/
edis05_e.htm as at 8.20 pm 16 August 2004
62  United States-Taxes on Automobiles, report circulated but not adopted 11 Octo-
ber1994, available at www.wto.org/tratop_e/envir_e/edis06_e.htm as at 8.20 pm 16 
August 2004 
63  M. Trebilcock and R. Howse, supra note 48, p. 413
64  United States-Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, WT/DS4/
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reformulated gasoline from Brazil and Venezuela, based on US environ-
mental legislation. Although the panel held Article XX (b) exemptions 
did not apply due to the lack of the US using the least trade-restrictive 
means of achieving its environmental objective, and the AB stressing 
that the chapeau of Article XX meant regard must be held to the rights 
of both parties, the US claim failed due to lack of seeking cooperation 
with foreign authorities in achieving environmental objectives. The dif-
ference between the two is that in Reformulated Gasoline, there was 
clear discrimination in the calculation of baseline for emissions in favor 
of US produce. Here, the underlying issue is clearly an attempted abuse 
of the DSU to achieve public choice policy goals, and a blatant disre-
gard of international obligations.
The implications of the consistency in attempts to manipulate ne-
gotiated rights and obligations through the “extended” approach be-
came clear in Shrimp.65 The issue was the same, the unilateral im-
position of US laws extraterritorially for inducing policy changes in 
other countries. Interestingly, all of the above cases except for Tuna/
Dolphin II involved weaker, developing countries, which depend heav-
ily on the US market. In Shrimp however, the US finally managed to 
legitimize its illegitimate use of extraterritorial policy imposition. In 
both instances, the panel and AB found the US to be in violation of 
its WTO obligations. However, the manipulation of the constant insis-
tence of past jurisprudence requiring the need for cooperation between 
national authorities to satisfy US environmental concerns was finally 
been achieved. It is unfortunate that the DSB did not enquire if the US 
had attempted to initiate a multilateral turtle conservation programme 
(the lesser trade restrictive measure accepted as a means of bringing its 
measure into conformity) prior to the unilateral application of its WTO 
inconsistent embargo on shrimp, as in Tuna/Dolphin I. Indeed the Ma-
laysian delegation specifically stated that had the US been sincere in 
its concern for sea turtles, it would have first sought the cooperation of 
the Malaysian government with its requirement for turtle exclusion de-
vises before imposing the embargo. In undertaking international obliga-
tions, such cooperation has to take place in a proper context, forum and 
AB/R of 12 January 1995
65  United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products WTO 
Doc WT/DS58/AB/R 
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with respect for national sovereignty to decide on undertaking treaty 
obligations, based on its perception of the benefits that would accrue 
from its rights and obligations under such a treaty. The final outcome of 
Shrimp has compromised the sovereignty of all Members of the WTO 
in allowing the use of international cooperation, subsequent to DSB 
adoption of the AB report that the US measure was inconsistent with 
its obligations, allowing the US to “bring its measure into conformity” 
by legitimizing its measure that was found to be inconsistent with its 
WTO obligations in the first place. Any attempt to rationalize this as a 
lesser trade restrictive measure is misplaced. Some authors incorrectly 
assert that such interpretation is unlikely to determine the substantive 
outcome of a WTO dispute.66 Others place unnecessary emphasis on the 
preparatory work and drafters’ intentions, with the mistaken belief that 
these are sufficient to expand the WTO’s DSB mandate.67 Such an ap-
proach to interpretation has been held by other authors to be unstable.68 
Further to assert that the WTO’s mandate is capable of being expanded 
through this way is very misplaced. According to these authors, the AB 
is able to expand the scope of Article XX GATT exceptions through 
the application of the Vienna Convention on Law of Treaties 1969 and 
even have created a whole methodology on how this is to be achieved 
in future,69 without addressing the fundamental question of whether the 
AB has gone beyond its mandate in the first place and if such expansion 
was what parties intended during negotiations. Other authors state that 
this decision satisfies a public relations objective and that this was ac-
complished without seriously compromising the trade rights guaranteed 
under the WTO Agreement.70 This contention is contrary to the rule-
based approach where public relations has no place in the balance of 
rights and obligations. This decision, notwithstanding its clear incom-
66  J. Pauwelyn, “How to Win a World Trade Organisation Dispute Settlement Based 
on Non-World Trade Organisation law”, Journal of World Trade, 37 (6) 977-1030, 
pp. 997-998
67  J. Hu, “The Role of International law in the Development of WTO Law” Journal 
of International Economic law 7 (1) 143-167, Oxford University Press 2004, p. 150 
68  A. McNair, The Law of Treaties, 2nd edition, Oxford university Press 1986, p. 421
69  P. Ala’i, “Free Trade or Sustainable Development? An Analysis of WTO Appellate 
Body’s Shift to a More Balanced Approach to Trade Liberalisation”, 14 American 
University International Law Review 1129, 1999, p. 1132-1169
70  A. Appleton “Shrimp/Turtle:Untangling the Nets”, Journal of International Eco-
nomic law 2 (3) 477-496, 1999
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patibility with everything the WTO stands for, would render obsolete 
the introduction of new issues into Ministerial Declarations and WTO 
work programs. The diplomacy function of international trade relations 
becomes redundant, and the rule-oriented approach becomes senseless, 
and the entire security and predictability of the envisaged DSU of the 
Punta Del Este Declaration is obliterated. As observed by some, the 
over emphasis by the AB on interpretation in this regard has exceeded 
its mandate. Rights and obligations as a result, are no longer derived 
from the agreement but from the decision of the AB.71 In the above 
case, such interpretation did indeed modify the meaning of compliance 
and the objectives of Article 3 (7) DSU. 
There is a view that the current slant of DSB decisions being declara-
tory72 in nature should continue to be applied.73 According to this view, 
the ambiguity of such decisions is strategic, in that it is purposefully 
unclear to bring parties to the negotiating table.74 The rational given is 
that it allows Members to deliberate without outside interference where 
parties could fashion the relief and the job of the decision maker is only 
of legal interpretation rather than material remediation.75 Taking up this 
point with regard to issues mentioned above,76 then it is not too safe 
an avenue, due to the imbalance in economic power between Members 
of the WTO. The place for such deliberations to fashion the relief for 
the purposes of discussion so far under this view should be, and is pro-
vided for under Article 4 of the DSU consultations.77 This point further 
emphasizes the reasons for the weaknesses in the consultative process, 
as Members, usually the more powerful of the two would benefit more 
71  D. Mc. Rea, supra note 28, p. 6
72  As opposed to corrective orders
73 C. Carmody, “Remedies and Conformity Under the WTO Agreement”, Journal 
of International Economic Law (2002) pp. 307-326. See also M. Bronckers, “Better 
Rules for a New Millennium : A Warning Against Undemocratic Developments in the 
WTO”, Journal of International Economic Law (1999), pp. 547-566
74  C. Carmody, Ibid
75  Ibid.
76  Regarding the matters that influence the decisions of a country to participate in a 
DSP.
77  Japan and EC submissions TN/DS/W/32 and TN/DS/W/38 in Table I, are criticized 
as the DSU provides sufficient avenue for consultations within the dispute settlement 
process. Additional consultations would eat away at the already sensitive issue of the 
duration of a dispute settlement process.
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from delaying the discussions to the last stage of the dispute settlement 
process, whilst continuing the application of the inconsistent measure. 
Furthermore, in the context of the WTO, where representation is gov-
ernmental and the right to participate as third parties is not automatic,78 
the environment is quite secure from outside interference during nego-
tiations.
The declaratory view draws it support in the WTO from the use of 
the plural “recommendations” of Article 19 (1) and (2) of the DSU, 
suggesting that a panel might make more than one recommendation. It 
supports its strategic theory from the use of bringing the measures “into 
conformity” in that “conformity” is ambiguous enough to achieve the 
objective of strategic ambiguity. 
According to this approach, to achieve compliance of the wrongdo-
er rather than correction of the plaintiff’s injury, would seek to prohibit 
the reinstitution of an offending measure, but not forbid measures of 
equivalent effect, provided they are implemented in a WTO-consistent 
manner.79 In US Superfund,80 a case involving a tax differential on pe-
troleum products refined in the US, the panel explained that the respon-
dent had three remedial options and that it was not the role of the panel 
to dictate any particular one. Accordingly, the three options included 
lowering the tax on foreign-refined crude or raising the tax on domestic 
crude or harmonizing the rate applicable to both domestic and foreign 
refined at some third point.81 Given the GATT’s objective of lowering 
trade barriers, the panel should have noted the three options but recom-
mended the best one in line with the objectives and sprit of the WTO 
Agreement. The ability to make suggestions on how to bring measures 
into conformity with WTO rules is a powerful tool that should be used 
more often.82 Some authors have proposed that Panels should make 
78  Article 10 DSU
79  Chi Carmody, supra note 73
80  United States-Taxes on Petroleum and Certain Imported Substances BISD 34th 
Supp 136 (17 June 1987) 
81  C. Carmody, supra note 73 
82  J. Pauwelyn, “Enforcement and Countermeasures in the WTO : Rules are rules-
Toward a more collective approach” The American Journal of International Law, 
April 2000, 94 A.J.I.L. 335 
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more use of their prevailing power83 to suggest specific measure for 
implementing WTO dispute settlement decisions. Respondents’ taking 
the suggested implementing measure would benefit from a legal pre-
sumption of WTO consistency and would dispense with the problems 
and concerns the “extended” approach has caused, which in turn would 
create greater faith and participation in the system by all Members.84
In settling a dispute under the WTO, Article 3 of the DSU speaks 
of a “satisfactory settlement of the matter” and to a “solution mutu-
ally acceptable to parties to a dispute and consistent with the covered 
agreements” with the view of providing security and predictability to 
the multilateral trading system. The outcome of the Shrimp85 applying 
the concept of strategic ambiguity satisfied neither of these objectives. 
The outcome of the case could be seen as a legitimisation of unilateral-
ism, and would further contribute to the exclusion of weaker members 
in participating in dispute settlement procedures due to the increased 
uncertainty. The contention that implementation in the Shrimp case is a 
multilateral concern and that it illustrates that compliance will probably 
go far beyond the original complainants to involve all those interested 
in supplying the relevant market86 is flawed for a number of reasons. 
Firstly, the negotiation of a multilateral turtle conservation agreement 
should not be made a criterion for conformity as the WTO offers the fo-
rum to initiate new multilateral agreements, and the DSU as an avenue 
to do so is incorrect. The effect of allowing this interpretation of con-
formity also impeaches on the sovereignty of a Member nation in inter-
fering with its choice of whether to agree to negotiate a new endeavor. 
Further, as in this case87, the pressure by environmental lobbyist was the 
driving force to the US administration enforcing a law that was in exis-
tence for some time but never applied extraterritorially for obvious rea-
sons.88 Secondly, Members conduct themselves based on negotiations 
83  Article 19 (1) DSU
84  E. Petersmann, “WTO Negotiators Meet Academics; The Negotiations on Improve-
ments of the WTO Dispute Settlement System” Journal of International Economic 
Law (2003), 
85  United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products WTO 
Doc WT/DS58/AB/R
86  C. Carmody, supra note 73
87  s. 601 of the US Endangered Species Act
88  Paragraph 2 (a) of the Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round 
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already concluded. Accepting negotiations on a separated agreement as 
part of conformity is akin to asking members to negotiate on something 
where negotiations have already concluded and rights and obligations 
already exist, ignoring the doctrine of pacta sunt servanda in public 
international law and disrupting the already existing negotiated balance 
of rights and obligations.89 The fact that the complainant’s persistent 
assertion that the negotiation of a multilateral turtle conservation agree-
ment and the conformity obligations of the US for the case at hand 
were separate issues, sacrifices the main aims of the DSU90 in favour 
of strategic ambiguity. Thirdly it puts market access (for the complain-
ant) in a worst position then before the new negotiations and the burden 
of obligations are operationalized before an agreement is reached. It 
ignores the issue of intentions of parties when adopting the agreement. 
In the Shrimp case, the better approach, it is submitted was for the 
panel or Appellate Body to make a clear, definitive decision whether 
the measure was either consistent, and if it were not, recommend its 
withdrawal, as in Article 3 (7). The ambiguity of “bringing into confor-
mity” and the subsequent qualification by the Article 21 (5) panel that 
the proposed negotiation of a multilateral turtle conservation agreement 
was sufficient conformity in the light of the surrounding circumstances 
of persistent objection and the manner the embargo was initiated in the 
first place creates extreme uncertainty in the DSU. 
The Article 21 (5) panel in this case referred to the good faith ef-
forts to reach a multilateral agreement as satisfied and compliance was 
deemed justified.91 The US government never approached the Malay-
sian Government before instituting the shrimp embargo. It only referred 
to the multilateral turtle conservation agreement after the finding of the 
Appellate Body in the original action. The Malaysian government’s re-
sponse before and during the Article 21 (5) panel proceeding was that 
of Multilateral Trade Negotiations encumbers upon members to have submitted the 
WTO Agreement to their respective authorities for approval, therefore ideally there 
should never be such an application of a domestic law extraterritorially in violation 
of WTO rules.
89  S. Charnovitz, “Rethinking WTO Trade Sanctions”, The American Journal of In-
ternational Law, Vol. 95, No. 4 (Oct., 2001) pp. 792-832
90  Article 3 (6) DSU
91  WT/DS58/RW
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compliance and the proposed multilateral shrimping agreement were 
separate and distinct issues. The manner in which the panel was able to 
read good faith from this adds even greater uncertainty and increases 
developing country lack of faith the DSU. According to some authors’ 
Malaysia’s ability to demand another Article 21 (5) panel is open-ended 
and that WTO conformity by the US may be reassessed at any time.92 
It is submitted, that for a developing country that has had to endure an 
embargo in excess of seven years, it is highly unlikely that Malaysia 
would seek another Article 21 (5) panel unlike Canada in the case of 
Brazil-Aircraft,93 for at least two reasons. Firstly it might be circum-
spect of what the panel will rule as in the first instance, and secondly 
there has been irreparable damage to its shrimping industry. The impact 
of the 21 (5) panel report was also to indirectly to create a reasonable 
period of time in perpetuity. Time can never run out as long as there is 
good faith efforts, the impact of such rulings are very obviously outside 
the competence of the DSU. It has been held that there are three key 
features that sets the WTO DSU apart from the rest. One of these is its 
ability to render binding decisions.94 Binding decisions that are ambigu-
ous enough to accommodate the declaratory view, it is submitted, is not 
worth the financial and political costs for a weaker nation to be willing 
to utilise the dispute settlement system. 
Article 3 (1) states that the DSU contains the principles for the 
management of disputes applied under Articles XXII and XXIII of the 
GATT 1994. Article 3 (2) states that the WTO dispute settlement system 
is a central element in providing security and predictability to the mul-
tilateral trading system95 and the DSB though its recommendations and 
rulings cannot add or diminish the rights and obligations of members 
provided in the covered agreements. Article 3 (3) recognizes that the 
prompt settlement of situations in which a Member considers that any 
benefits accruing to it directly or indirectly under the covered agree-
ments are being impaired by measures taken by another Member is es-
92  J. Kearns and S. Charnovitz, “Adjudicating Compliance in the WTO : A Review of 
DSU Article 21.5”, Journal of International Economic Law, (2002)
93  Brazil-Export Financing Programme for Aircraft WTO Doc WT/DS46/ARB
94  B. McGivern, “Seeking Compliance With WTO Rulings on Globalisation”, 36 The 
International Lawyer 141, Spring 2002
95  Indeed an effective and credible DSM is pivotal to the success of any agreement. 
See M. Martin, supra note 1
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sential to the effective functioning of the WTO and the maintenance of 
a proper balance between the rights and obligations of Members. DSB 
decisions are aimed at achieving a satisfactory settlement of matters in 
accordance with rights and obligations under the Understanding and 
covered agreements.96 The aim of the DSM is to secure a positive solu-
tion to a dispute.97
Article 3 (7) of the DSU sets out a hierarchy of four methods of 
implementation of DSB decisions98:
i. a mutually acceptable solution, which is clearly to be preferred;
ii. in the absence of a mutually acceptable solution, is usually the with-
drawal of the measure concerned;
iii. if immediate withdrawal of the measure concerned is impractical 
parties should agree on compensation as a temporary measure;
iv. as a last resort, the possibility of suspending the application of con-
cessions or other obligations on a discriminatory basis vis a vis the 
failing Member, subject to authorization of the DSB.
II.  CONCLUSION
Therefore the DSU and Articles XXII and XXIII of GATT 1994 
seek to provide a balanced approach to the settlement of disputes 
through firstly, consultations to achieve a mutually acceptable solution 
as envisaged by article 3 (7), and failing a settlement/solution, a mecha-
nism that provides transparent, prompt, equitable and positive conclu-
sion through the panel and appellate processes. Central to this is that 
such decisions of the DSB must be confined to matters related to in the 
covered agreements to which the WTO DSU is guardian. This conclu-
sion is arrived at from the emphasis placed on the covered agreements 
in Article 3 (2) – (9) and 3. (11) and (12), and Article 1 (1) which cites 
Appendix 1 as containing a list of covered agreements to which the 
WTO DSU will apply. This therefore makes it unequivocally clear that 
the WTO DSU cannot concern itself with matters not arising from or 
96  Article 3 (4) DSU
97  Article 3 (7) DSU
98  A. Rosas, “Implementation and Enforcement of WTO Dispute Settlement Findings: 
An EU Perspective, Journal of International Economic Law (2001) ,pp 131-144
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having anything to do with the agreements mentioned in Appendix 1. 
The impact of the Article 21 (5) Panel on what compliance entails in 
Shrimp, has damaged the DSU as it has created uncertainty from what 
is to be expected from a dispute settlement proceeding. The uncertainty, 
in turn affects the credibility and stability of the system. The economic 
and political cost of participating in a dispute, especially when the com-
plainant is a developing country and the respondent a powerful devel-
oped member is clear. When the DSM does not create an environment 
for a weaker country to pursue its rights due to the instability of the 
system, it will cause members to pot for alternative means of steeling 
disputes. This when relating to parties of unequal economic and po-
litical power reverts the system to a power-based as opposed to a rule 
based one, undoing everything the WTO was meant to achieve.
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